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Abstract 
We show that temporary place-based subsidies generate persistent effects on 
economic density. As our design allows us to control for agglomeration economies, 
we attribute an important role to policy-induced locational advantage (e.g. capital 
structures) in explaining persistent spatial patterns of economic activity. With 
regard to distributional implications, we show that subsidies have capitalized in land 
rents, so pre-treatment land owners have benefitted predominantly from the 
program. 
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1 Introduction
When supporting underdeveloped regions, policy makers often hope that temporary trans-
fers establish self-sustaining long-run economic development. The e↵ort is substantial. For
example, the EU dedicates about one third of its overall budget 2014-2020 to regional pol-
icy amounting to more than 350 billion euros (European Commission, 2011). The US does
not have a unified regional policy, but annual spending on regional development programs
is estimated at about 95 billion US dollars per year (Government Accountability O ce,
2012). Also China has installed regional policies that resemble those in the EU in terms
of instruments and magnitude (European Commission, 2010).
Despite these e↵orts, little is known about the long-term consequences of these pro-
grams and their underlying mechanisms (Neumark and Simpson, 2015).1 Using a natural
experiment from Germany allows us to make progress in this direction. In 1971, the West
German government started a large scale transfer program to stimulate economic devel-
opment in a well-defined geographical area adjacent to the Iron Curtain. All districts that
accommodated either 50 percent of their area or population within a distance of 40 kilo-
meters to the inner-German and Czechoslovakian border on January 1, 1971 became part
of the Zonenrandgebiet (ZRG).2 As shown in Figure 1, it stretched from the Danish border
in the North to the Austrian border in the South running through four states (Bavaria,
Hesse, Lower-Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein). A major reason for this privileged treat-
ment was to compensate firms and households close to the eastern border for being cut
o↵ adjacent markets on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Policy makers were afraid that
the remoteness could cause substantial out-migration to the western parts of the country.3
The program was not intended for a fixed number of years and its termination came as
unexpectedly as German reunification. As transfers were redirected towards East Ger-
many after 1990, the place-based policy was phased out until 1994. We are therefore able
to study both the contemporaneous and persistent e↵ects of the policy.
1The literature on placed-based policies has mostly looked into the e↵ects of transfers during programs,
e.g. Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013) evaluate the federal empowerment zones program in the US, Glaeser
and Gottlieb (2008) examine the place-based policy Appalachian Regional Commission, Gobillon, Magnac,
and Selod (2012) study the French enterprise zone program, Becker, Egger, and Ehrlich (2010) focus on
income and employment e↵ects of EU Structural Funds.
2See Deutscher Bundestag (1970), Drucksache VI/796 and Ziegler (1992, p.9). Zonenrandgebiet literally
means area adjacent to the (Soviet occupation) zone, that became the German Democratic Republic. It
was common in West Germany to refer to the German Democratic Republic as the “Zone”.
3See Ziegler (1992) for a more detailed exposition.
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Figure 1: The German Zonenrandgebiet (ZRG), 1971-1994
Note: The blue lines mark the western border of the ZRG and the Iron Curtain. The grey lines represent the
municipalities according to the 1997 classification while the red lines define state borders. The border of the ZRG
follows the administrative districts according to the 1971 classification which was modified substantially in the
mid-1970s. In most of our analysis we consider the states Schleswig-Holstein (SH), Lower Saxony (LS), North
Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Hesse (HE), and Bavaria (BA).
The institutional setting of the ZRG gives rise to two types of discontinuities that we
can use for identification of causal e↵ects. First, we apply a spatial regression discontinuity
design (RDD) based on municipalities and grid cells in a close neighborhood on either
side of the treatment border. If other relevant factors vary continuously at the ZRG-
border, a discontinuity in economic activity at this border can be interpreted as the causal
e↵ect of the place-based policy. As the treatment border does not separate areas with
di↵erent institutions, many concerns of other discontinuities that are important at country
borders can be ruled out. Nevertheless, administrative borders are unlikely to be drawn
randomly. To establish more credibility of our results, we also exploit the political rule
which governed the location of the treatment border. As the treatment probability of
districts jumps at a distance of 40 kilometers from the Iron Curtain, we apply a classical
2
regression discontinuity design. The advantage is that the 40-kilometer rule does not
coincide with any administrative boundary nor with geographic features that may cause
discontinuities in relevant determinants for outcome. Depending on parametric or non-
parametric estimation and the choice of the control function, we find that regional transfers
led to higher income per square kilometer in the treatment area by about 30-50 percent
in 1986. Undertaking the same exercise for 2010, that is 16 years after the program was
eventually stopped, there is no indication that the estimated e↵ects have diminished. We
provide evidence that a substantial part of this discontinuity can be explained by local
relocation of economic activity. Further, we demonstrate that higher income per square
kilometer was driven by higher private and public capital intensity and higher population
and employment – both in the mid-1980s and in 2010. However, we find no evidence that
the educational composition of the workforce was a↵ected. Identifying causal persistent
e↵ects of a place-based policy and their underlying channels establishes a first contribution
of this paper.4
There is a lively debate in the literature about the determinants of persistence in the
spatial distribution of economic activity in the long run.5 For example, Bleakley and
Lin (2012) show that historical portage sites in the US serve as a good predictor for the
location of cities today. As they do not find substantial di↵erences in the capital stock
or capital intensity between portage and non-portage sites, they interpret their findings
as evidence in favor of agglomeration economies rather than capital structures. Kline and
Moretti (2014) analyze the e↵ects of the Tennessee Valley Authority program showing
that manufacturing employment continued to grow after transfers into this region were
stopped in 1960. They argue that initial capital investments before 1960 are unlikely to
be responsible for this long-run e↵ect as the capital stock would have depreciated several
decades later.6
It is in the nature of spatial RDD that all determinants of outcome that are con-
tinuous at the border are implicitly controlled for. Based on recent work by Turner,
4Kline and Moretti (2014) have found persistent e↵ects of a place-based policy in the US while Ahlfeldt,
Maennig, and Richter (2016) find no persistence of urban renewal policies in Berlin.
5For syntheses of the theoretical literature on agglomeration economies see Duranton and Puga (2004).
6Schumann (2014) documents persistent e↵ects of di↵erent levels of local population due to di↵erent
settlement policies for refugees in the American and French occupation zones in Germany after World War
II. Redding, Sturm, and Wolf (2011) regard the persistent relocation of the main German airport from
Berlin to Frankfurt (initiated during the Cold War) as evidence for multiple spatial equilibria. Michaels
and Rauch (2014) study the impact of the Roman Empire for the evolution of urban structures in France
and the UK.
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Haughwout, and van der Klaauw (2014), if externalities (e.g. agglomeration economies
like labor-market pooling, technology spillovers, or the home-market e↵ect, among oth-
ers) dissipate continuously with distance, these determinants cannot be part of the local
average treatment e↵ect. However, they certainly do matter for explaining di↵erences in
economic density of locations that are more distant from the treatment border. We ex-
ploit information from satellite data (capital structures and radiance) at a very fine scale
of up to 100m ⇥ 100m, study subsamples of municipality pairs that are well-connected
by transport networks, not separated by undeveloped land (e.g. forests), or characterized
by a polycentric structure to verify the plausibility of this assumption. As discontinuities
remain prevalent in these exercises, we argue that capital structures play an important
role in explaining persistence in spatial outcomes. This reasoning is in line with our find-
ings that the policy has led to an expansion of capital structures (e.g. industrial parks,
roads, power networks, and sewage systems) in the Zonenrandgebiet. These structures
are likely to generate a persistent e↵ect because the associated planning process has a
long-term value. It is easier to maintain established structures than planning new ones
on the green field. Moreover, higher economic density generates higher tax revenues that
can be reinvested to maintain established structures or local governments have learned
to manage commercial activities better during the times of treatment. In essence, these
channels are able to raise local productivity of firms and thereby maintain higher invest-
ment levels across a historic treatment border.7 A last explanation for persistence that
we explore is potential interactions of shocks with economic density. Studying German
reunification in 1990 and EU enlargement in 2004 shows, however, that these arguably
important shocks contribute only 2 to 6 percent to the overall treatment e↵ect. Isolating
policy-generated locational advantage as an additional explanation for persistent spatial
outcomes is a second main contribution of the paper.
Third, we explore the distributional implications of the place-based policy. Policy
makers often initiate place-based policies to raise wages and employment, in particular of
poor households.8 However, there is concern that regional transfers eventually capitalize
in higher land rents (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008) such that the beneficiaries of the policy
are those households that owned property before the program. If land supply is not
infinitely elastic, an increase in economic activity eventually leads to higher land prices.
7In this regard, our paper links to Davis and Weinstein (2002, 2008) attributing a key role to local
structures in explaining the long-term spatial pattern of economic activity.
8European Commission (2014).
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Our results confirm these concerns. We find that ZRG-transfers raised land rents by
around 30 percent both in 1988 and 2010 which approximately o↵set the nominal per-
capita income gain in the recipient regions. In a Rosen-Roback framework, this points to
local persistent production amenities that – according to our empirical approach – have
to be discontinuous at the treatment border (cf. Rosen, 1979; Roback, 1982). In sum,
we show that the place-based policy did a↵ect the spatial economic structure persistently,
but the beneficiaries of the subsidies program are (pre-treatment) land owners.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of the
historical and institutional background of the transfer program. Sections 3 and 4 introduce
the data and identification strategies we use. We present results in section 5 and analyze
the underlying mechanisms of persistence. We study the distributional implications of the
policy in section 6 before o↵ering concluding remarks.
2 Historical background
As Germany’s surrender in the Second World War became more likely, the Allied Forces
started negotiations about the borders of post-war Germany and the division among the
US, the UK, France and the Soviet Union in 1943. Di↵erent political ideologies caused
growing tensions between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union and eventually led to
the division of the country into the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the
German Democratic Republic (East Germany). When the government in East Germany
began to install fences and even a death strip at the inner-German border in 1952, passage
of goods and people became impossible. Regular transit was only allowed between East
and West Berlin until the erection of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961 finally closed
this last loop hole for nearly 30 years.
While regional transfers in the 1950s targeted primarily former industrial centers that
were heavily bombed during the war, politicians in West Germany also responded to the
new situation of a divided state.9 Districts at the inner-German border received support
to prevent outmigration of residents and firms. This was a serious concern as the Iron
Curtain deteriorated the living conditions for both psychological and economic reasons.
At this point, West German policy makers widely regarded the division of Germany as a
temporary phenomenon such that transfers were justified to preserve the economic position
9See Karl (2008) for a more detailed review of regional policy in West Germany.
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of the geographical center of pre-war Germany for the time after reunification.10 Hence,
politicians recognized the potentially long-lasting consequence of an event which was then
still considered temporary. A further motivation for privileged treatment of the ZRG was
geopolitical. An economically strong border region was expected to provide a better bu↵er
against a potential attack of Warsaw Pact troops (Ziegler, 1992).
However, there was no clear rule yet for the allocation of resources. It was not until
the late 1960s that the Federal Ministry of Economics suggested a better coordination of
regional policy.11 While a politically-installed committee decided about the eligibility of
regions to receive transfers, the Zonenrandgebiet was guaranteed privileged support by
law (Zonenrandfo¨rderungsgesetz, 1971) within this framework. The federal law of 1971
provided a transparent definition of the ZRG that was never modified until ZRG treatment
was eventually stopped in 1994: All districts that accommodated at least 50 percent of
their area or population within 40 kilometers to the inner-German or Czechoslovakian
border on January 1, 1971 became part of the Zonenrandgebiet.12 Its area accounted for
18.6 percent of the West German territory accommodating 12.3 percent of the population
(see Table A1). It is remarkable that the ZRG boundaries were never modified despite
substantial changes in district and municipality borders, especially in the mid-1970s. The
ZRG program lost its status in 1994 when Germany was reunified and the focus of regional
policy abruptly shifted to the development of the ‘New La¨nder’.
The ZRG transfer scheme comprised a menu of measures. A major focus was laid on
subsidies for firm investment. Firms inside the Zonenrandgebiet could apply for investment
subsidies of up to 25 percent. For initial investment, the total value of direct subsidies and
tax deductions could even reach about 50 percent of the investment volume.13 Further,
firms were eligible for superior credit conditions of the public bank KfW (Kreditanstalt
10Bundesministerium fu¨r innerdeutsche Beziehungen (1987).
11This initiative led to two important laws in 1969: (i) the Joint Task “Improvement of the Regional
Economic Structure” (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur, GRW) (see
Eckey (2008) for a historical overview of the Joint Task) and (ii) the Investment Premium Law (Investiti-
tionszulagengesetz).
12See Deutscher Bundestag (1970), Drucksache VI/796 and Ziegler (1992, p.9). According to a statement
by state secretary Sauerborn, the 40-kilometer rule also included less needy regions, but was appealing for
practical reasons in the first place (see Protocol of the 39th session of the cabinet committee of economics).
It was recognized in the parliamentary debate on June 17, 1971 that the treatment border must remain
fixed over time in order to rule out strategic modifications of local district borders (see Protocol of the
128th session of the Bundestag).
13See Ziegler (1992) and Zonenrandfo¨rderungsgesetz (ZRFG), 1971, available at
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/11/050/1105099.pdf (Anhang 3).
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fu¨r Wiederaufbau), capital allowances were more generous, and there was a large program
of public debt guarantees. Moreover, companies located in the ZRG were treated with
priority in public tendering. Beyond firm subsidies, a substantial share of the budget
was dedicated towards public infrastructure projects and transfers could also be used
for renovation of houses, investments in social housing, day care centers, education and
cultural activities. This heterogeneity of measures makes it impossible to report a single
money value of the ZRG program.
While the overall figure is unavailable, we do have data on certain parts of the ZRG
program (e.g. subsidies from the Investment Premium Law). This allows us to document
that the ZRG received the lion’s share of the transfer budget. Between 1984 and 1987
about 60 and 85 percent of total public transfers in the states we consider was directed
to the ZRG.14 Note that data on tax deductions, the value of public tenders, and other
monetary advantages that applied specifically to the ZRG are not available such that
the treatment intensity of the ZRG was even higher than these numbers suggest. To get
an idea about the overall size of the program, estimates range between 1.3-2.5 billion
euros (at 2010 prices) per year in the 1980s which amounts to about 194-373 euros per
capita.15 This makes it comparable to the size of current EU Structural Funds amounting
to annual transfers of about 230 euros per capita in regions with the highest transfer
intensity (Becker, Egger, and Ehrlich, 2010).
3 Data
The basis of our empirical work is geographical and administrative data from municipalities
and the exact location of the Zonenrandgebiet border. According to the precise definition
of the ZRG, we georeference a map of West German districts in 1971 to identify the
exact location of both the Iron Curtain (inner-German and Czechoslovakian border) and
the ZRG border that separates the treatment from the control area.16 To georeference
municipality data, we use digital maps (shape files) from the Bundesamt fu¨r Kartographie
und Geoda¨sie.
14Documentation of the Joint Task, Rahmenplan No. 13, available at www.bundestag.de.
15See Ziegler (1992) and Wirtschaftswoche, 1990 Nr. 99/4. About 6.7 million individuals were living in
the ZRG in 1961.
16The map we use is provided by the former Bundesforschungsanstalt fu¨r Landeskunde und Raum-
forschung at a scale of 1:1,000,000.
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Table 1: Observational units
No. municipalities
Total Boundary sample No. districts
1986 2010 1986 2010 Total Boundary sample
Non-ZRG 3,367 3,391 2,298 2,305 396 202
ZRG 1,573 1,576 1,572 1,576 106 107
Total 4,940 4,967 3,870 3,881 502 309
Notes: We consider the states (La¨nder) Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, and
Bavaria. These five states comprise in total 4,991 and 5,018 populated municipalities in 1986 and 2010, respec-
tively. We lose 51 municipalities due to partial treatment (i.e. ZRG border crosses the municipality) and imprecise
assignment to municipal boundaries in the digital maps (see Appendix A for details). The boundary sample on the
municipality level contains all municipalities with a distance to the ZRG border of less than 100km; the boundary
sample on the district level includes all districts with Md  150 (see section 6). Districts are based on the 1969
classification, municipalities on the 1997 and 2010 classifications.
This georeferencing provides us with relevant distance measures for each municipality
and coordinates that we use as controls in several econometric specifications. We compile
a unique data set on municipality characteristics between 1984 and 2012 and merge it with
the information on location and district a liation in 1971. In most cases and depending
on data availability, we refer to the year 1986 for contemporaneous e↵ects of the policy,
and estimate the persistent e↵ects in 2010.17 We use (taxable) nominal income per square
kilometer as our main proxy of overall economic activity. We further use data broadly
categorized in measures of local labor and capital intensity which we introduce below.
Details about the data and data sources are provided in Appendix A.
We use two di↵erent samples based on municipalities and districts, respectively (Table
1). This is required by the econometric approaches we introduce below. We consider
the five states (La¨nder) that include or border on the treated region: Schleswig-Holstein,
Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, and Bavaria comprising in total 4,991 and
5,018 populated municipalities in 1986 and 2010, respectively. The boundary sample of
municipalities used in most estimations contains all jurisdictions with a distance to the
ZRG border of less than 100 kilometers. This includes all municipalities in the treated
region and about 68 percent of the municipalities in the five states west of the ZRG border.
For the boundary sample at the district level, we limit the observations to jurisdictions
17Note that our results are robust to using 2013 data where available.
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that are su ciently close to the threshold determining transfer eligibility which will be
described in detail below. This includes again all treated observations and about 50
percent of the districts outside the treated area and in the five states. Note that all our
analyses are based on the 1971 district classification such that the number of districts
remains constant over time.
4 Identification
Regional policy usually targets very specific groups of recipients. For instance, these can
be regions lagging behind in terms of economic performance, cities being confronted with
a high degree of poverty and emigration, or firms lacking private funds. Hence, public sub-
sidies are not distributed randomly impeding a causal evaluation of such programs. This
holds also true for the regional subsidies we analyze. Simple t-tests about the equivalence
of the averages in the groups of transfer recipients and controls suggest significant di↵er-
ences for many variables across groups. For instance, income per square kilometer and
population density are higher by about 10 and 27 percent in the group of non-subsidized
municipalities than in the treatment group and these di↵erences turn out significant at
conventional levels. This points to the expectable selection issue and implies that an
unconditional comparison may lead to false conclusions.
Yet, the transfer program we study gives rise to two types of discontinuities that gen-
erate quasi-random variation and are the basis of most of our econometric exercises. First,
we examine observations in a close neighborhood on either side of the treatment border.
Provided that other regional characteristics vary smoothly in space, a discontinuous jump
in the outcomes of interest at the ZRG border can be attributed to the place-based policy.
This approach is referred to as Spatial Discontinuity Design or Boundary Discontinuity
Design.18 Second, we exploit a discontinuity in the political rule that governed the treat-
ment eligibility of regions and allows for local randomization of transfer recipience.
18Other applications of spatial RDD include Black (1999) focussing on school district boundaries to
quantify the willingness to pay for a more educated neighborhood, Lalive (2008) identifying the e↵ects of
unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment, Dell (2010) documenting the long-run impact
of historical labor market institutions.
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4.1 Spatial RDD
We denote by Yi0 and Yi1 the potential outcomes of a municipality i in the situations
with and without transfers, respectively. Our aim is to identify the e↵ect of a transfer
Ti which corresponds to ⌧ = Yi0   Yi1. As counterfactual situations for individual units
are unobservable, we aim at estimating an average treatment e↵ect E[⌧i] for a group of
comparable treated and control units. Our outset represents a special case of a two-
dimensional RDD where the location of each municipality relative to the threshold is
described by latitude and longitude, Li = (Lix, Liy). Similarly, the boundary between the
treatment area A+ and the control area A  consists of an infinite number of border points
b = (bx, by) 2 B.
Due to the geographic nature of the policy measure, assignment to treatment is a dis-
continuous function of location, T = 1{Li 2 A+}, where units east of B receive treatment
while those to the west do not. In the spatial discontinuity design, location acts as the
so-called forcing variable and we focus on the discontinuity of expected outcome at the
geographical border:
⌧(b) ⌘ E[Yi1   Yi0|l = b] = lim
l+!b
E[Yi|Li = l+]  lim
l !b
E[Yi|Li = l ], (1)
where l+ 2 A+ and l  2 A  refer to locations in treated and control areas, respectively.
Accordingly, ⌧(b) identifies the average treatment e↵ect at the border point b. In contrast
to a one-dimensional regression discontinuity design, our approach yields a function of
treatment e↵ects evaluated at each border point b 2 B. For most of our analysis we
consider the average treatment e↵ect along the whole border while we explore variations
in the treatment e↵ects across locations for sensitivity checks and to analyze the role of
agglomeration externalities for persistence.19
The identification strategy of a regression discontinuity rests on two comparably weak
assumptions (see Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw, 2001). First, counterfactual outcomes
E[Yi0|Li] and E[Yi1|Li] have to be continuous at the border, that is all relevant variables
besides treatment must change smoothly. Second, selective sorting at the border must be
ruled out to ensure that treatment is “as good as” randomly assigned (Lee and Lemieux,
19See Papay, Willett, and Murnane (2011) for treatment e↵ect heterogeneity in a two-dimensional RDD
and non-geographic context. Importantly, this design allows us to limit the estimation to border segments
where frictions at municipality borders are likely to be absent.
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2010). Hence, municipalities must not be able to (precisely) manipulate their location
relative to the treatment border. Since the treatment e↵ect in the geographic discontinuity
design is identified for units converging to the boundary, we also pursue the analysis using
information on capital structures and luminosity that vary at a very fine spatial scale (e.g.
grid cells of 100m⇥ 100m) around the border.
The first assumption is fulfilled if the ZRG border was drawn randomly. However,
there is reason to argue that administrative boundaries are usually not set at random,
but follow some specific features such as rivers, mountains or cultural borders which may
lead to discontinuities in other characteristics that matter for outcome. Common ways
to address this issue include testing for discontinuities in relevant covariates (Dell, 2010)
and removing border segments from the sample that seem to follow a problematic pattern
(Black, 1999). While we pursue both robustness checks, we emphasize they are naturally
limited in the sense that only a selection of covariates can be checked. Following this path,
we thus cannot rule out a discontinuity in another relevant factor with certainty. We use
two institutional features in our specific context to rebut these concerns. First, the ZRG
border separates a set of 75 individual district pairs over a distance of 1,737 kilometers.
These pairs may be divided according to historical routes, but there is no reason to expect
that the ones in the treated area had systematically superior or inferior characteristics
than the ones in the control area across all 75 pairs. Second, the district borders were
modified substantially only a few years after the start of the ZRG-treatment whereas the
ZRG border remained fully unchanged. Hence, the largest part of the ZRG border did
not coincide with the relevant administrative district borders during the time we study.20
To further improve confidence in our results, we will contrast the discontinuity at the
threshold prior to the start of the program with the contemporaneous e↵ects such that
time invariant confounding discontinuities will cancel. Finally and most importantly, we
will exploit the 40-kilometer rule that determined the actual treatment border, but did
not coincide with any administrative or geographical boundary.
The second identifying assumption requires that districts or municipalities cannot (or
only imprecisely) select themselves into treatment. In practice this means that municipali-
ties in the control area must not be able to receive transfers by merging with municipalities
located inside the originally-defined ZRG or influence the location of the border. As A+
20Roughly 57 percent of the 1,737km ZRG border ceased to represent a district border already between
1971 and 1978.
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was never changed (despite changes in jurisdictional boundaries), this assumption is justi-
fied.21 Note, however, that individuals and firms may choose their place of residence and
thus sort across the border. This potential change in the spatial equilibrium is what we
are interested in as it is the consequence of treatment. As in Dell (2010), migration across
treated and control regions is one of the channels we study.
We implement the spatial RDD both in a parametric and in a non-parametric way. In
the former case we state the conditional expectations in (1) as E[Yi0|Li] = ↵ + f(Li) +
g0(Di) and E[Yi1|Li] = ↵ + ⌧ + f(Li) + g1(Di) where f(Li) represents flexible polyno-
mials of geographic location and Di refers to the shortest distance from i’s centroid to
the treatment border (B), i.e. the perpendicular to the closest border point. The inclu-
sion of asymmetric distance control functions accounts for the possibility that proximity
to the treatment border influences outcomes di↵erently for transfer recipients and non-
recipients.22 Controlling for Li may be important as units with the same distance to B
may in fact be quite di↵erent if they are located in di↵erent parts of Germany (e.g. north
versus south or distance to the sea, state/country borders). Thus, the regression model is
given by:
Yi = ↵+ g0(Di) + f(Li) + Ti[⌧ + g1(Di)  g0(Di)] + "i. (2)
Since g1(Di)   g0(Di) converges to zero for observations close to the border, the average
treatment e↵ect is captured by ⌧ˆ . Since the credibility of the results rest on the correct
specification of the control functions, we run alternative regressions with di↵erent func-
tional forms (e.g. order of the polynomials), with and without coordinate control functions
(f(Li)), for di↵erent windows around the ZRG border, and we include border-segment
fixed e↵ects as well as state fixed e↵ects.23
The assumptions about the form of the geographic control functions can be further
relaxed by estimating the treatment e↵ect in a non-parametric way. To do so, we employ
local linear regressions and estimate the conditional expectations at the border as stated
in (1). Notice that we base our estimates for E[Yi0|Li = b] and E[Yi1|Li = b] only on
21Municipalities that were located outside the ZRG and merged with municipalities in the treatment
area could not become eligible for transfers. In such cases the treatment border passes through the munic-
ipalities. The jurisdictional boundaries as of January 1, 1971 remained relevant for treatment throughout
the duration of the program.
22By presuming symmetric functions on both sides of the RDD threshold, a kink may be misinterpreted
as a discontinuity (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
23Limiting the sample to small windows around the threshold can substitute for including a higher order
control function but requires a su cient density of observations.
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Table 2: Distance & assignment variable
ZRG Non-ZRG
Mean Std. Min Max Mean Std. Min Max
Distance to B (Di) 22,702 15,807 88 97,603 40,203 28,497 183 99,953
Md 20.337 11.322 3 45 88.021 29.664 42 149
Notes: Distances are in meters and refer to municipality centroids. The assignment variable Md is defined as
the minimum distance (in km) from the Iron Curtain that includes the majority share of the district area. It is
determined at the district level according to the 1971 classification. Each municipality is uniquely assigned to a
district. Three districts received treatment although not being eligible according to the rule and thus generate
fuzzyness. Of those districts being eligible according to the treatment rule all received treatment. We dropped all
observations with a distance of more than 150km to the ZRG border and districts with Md > 150.
observations in A+ and A , respectively. As in the parametric approach, we condition
on the forcing variable Dib and estimate univariate local linear regressions for a set of 20
border points b1, ...,b20 which are allocated at equal distances along the border.24 The
corresponding results crucially depend on the choice of bandwidth. We derive the optimal
bandwidth h⇤ according to the criterion suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
and use a triangular kernel (see Fan and Gijbels, 1996, and Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).25
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the distance of observations from B. Although
the treated area corresponds mostly to a narrow band of 40 kilometers there are treated
observations in the north-east (in particular on the island Fehmarn) located at a distance
of up to 100 kilometers from the ZRG border. The closest municipal centroids lie at about
88 and 183 meters from B for the treatment and control groups, respectively.26 Due to
the nature of the transfer program the distance to the ZRG border is positively correlated
with the distances to the Iron Curtain. However, as the location of the ZRG border is
determined by the districts’ shape, size, and location the correlation between distance to B
24We check the sensitivity of our results with 10 and 30 border points. As an alternative approach
we followed Papay, Willett, and Murnane (2011) using a bivariate non-parametric regression with the
arguments Lix and Liy. Due to the “curse of dimensionality” bivariate local linear regressions require a
much higher density of data. For this reason we favor the univariate non-parametric approach. However,
all our results are robust to the bivariate non-parametric regression approach. See Appendix, Figure B1
for a more detailed description of the non-parametric specifications.
25Alternatively, we use cross-validation procedures and vary the bandwidth manually.
26As an alternative to the centroids’ distances from B – which can be very small with narrow munici-
palities – we approximate the location of a municipality by the average over a su ciently large number of
grid cells within the municipal boundaries. All our results are robust to this alternative. In this case we
split each municipality into 100m⇥ 100m grids, determine longitude, latitude as well as distances from B
for each grid cell and take the municipal averages across grid cells to obtain g(D) and f(L).
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and distance to the Iron Curtain is only about 0.6 for the boundary sample and reduces to
less than 0.05 when we limit the sample to a 20-kilometer window from B. This points to
an important advantage of our setting, namely the clear geographic criterion that defined
the Zonenrandgebiet.
4.2 Classical RDD: Exploiting the political treatment rule
Recall that those districts that accommodated either 50 percent of its area or population
within a band of 40 kilometers to the Iron Curtain at the beginning of 1971 became part of
the ZRG. The blue-shaded area in Panel A of Figure 2 illustrates the 40-kilometer bu↵er.
It is evident that the ZRG border roughly follows the bu↵er, but we observe pixel and
municipalities at the same distance from the Iron Curtain featuring a di↵erent treatment
status. The political rule allows us to generate an assignment variable, denoted by Md,
indicating a district’s minimum distance from the Iron Curtain that includes the majority
share of the district’s area. Hence, this assignment criterion does not only depend on a
municipality’s distance from the Iron Curtain but also on the shape of the superordinate
district it belongs to. At M0 = 40, we should expect a discontinuity in the probability of
receiving treatment which we can exploit as exogenous variation to identify the causal e↵ect
of transfers on economic outcomes. As the 40-kilometer bu↵er has no natural relevance
and does not correspond to administrative borders, it is uncritical to presume that there
are no discontinuities in other relevant factors at M0.
We compute isodistance-curves from the Iron Curtain using GIS software as illustrated
in Panel B of Figure 2. This allows us to compute the area share of each district for each
distance to the Iron Curtain. Finally, we determine for each district the minimum distance
bu↵er where the area share exceeds 50 percent. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of
Md for the treatment and control groups.27 Apparently, none of the control observations
was eligible for treatment and all exceptions belong to the treatment group. If these
exemptions from the 40-kilometer rule were not too frequent, we should observe a jump
27An alternative translation of the treatment rule would be to compute the area share of a district
within the 40-kilometer bu↵er Sd. We did this as a robustness check and find a pronounced discontinuity
at Sd = 0.5 as suggested by the rule. Yet, this assignment variable has the drawback of clustering at
Sd = 0 and accordingly is less powerful.
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Figure 2: Assignment variable
Panel A. Panel B.
Notes: The above maps show district borders according to the 1971 classification. The light blue area in the left
hand map marks the 40-kilometer distance from the Iron Curtain, the dark blue line refers to the ZRG border. The
right hand map illustrates the bu↵er lines (in red) drawn in 1km intervals from the Iron Curtain.
in the probability of treatment at the threshold M0 = 40:
P (Tid|fMd) = ( h1(fMd) if fMd  0
h0(fMd) if fMd > 0, (3)
where fMd =Md  M0 denotes the centered version of the assignment variable.
Figure 3 depicts the treatment indicator Tid against the assignment variable Md. The
discontinuity at 40 kilometers is evident, but the design is fuzzy because a few districts
with Md > M0 still receive ZRG treatment. Overall, non-compliance is not a big issue
because only three districts were “mis-assigned”. This is most likely driven by the second
criterion of the political rule concerning population share, that is the non-compliers are
those districts that did not accommodate 50 percent of the area within 40 kilometers to
the eastern border, but 50 percent of the population.28 Although we cannot account for
28We lack data about the population distribution within districts such that the second part of the rule
may not be considered. Importantly, the rule requires only one of the criteria to be satisfied such that
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Figure 3: Treatment probability
Notes: The assignment variable is measured at the district level. We consider only districts overlapping with a
150km bu↵er from the Iron Curtain. All districts further to the west are dropped from the sample.
this second criterion due to data limitations, we can obtain consistent estimators of the
treatment e↵ect by exploiting the discontinuity in the probability. The average treatment
e↵ect in this case is given by the ratio between the jump in the outcome and the jump in
the treatment probability at M0 (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010, for details).
We estimate the fuzzy RDD in a parametric as well as in a non-parametric fashion. In
the latter approach we estimate the conditional expectations of outcome and treatment
probability by means of local linear regressions separately for observations with fMd > 0
and those with fMd 6 0. We employ an edge kernel and follow Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) in choosing an optimal bandwidth h⇤ that minimizes the mean squared error of the
average treatment e↵ect.29 The parametric approach follows a 2SLS approach where the
Md su ces as an assignment variable in the spirit of a fuzzy RDD. A precise measure of population
distribution within districts was not even available at the time of treatment assignment and all but three
districts (Schlu¨chtern, Einbeck, and Peine) were assigned strictly according to the first part of the rule.
Hence, we may also drop those three districts and proceed in the spirit of a sharp RDD which yields almost
identical results and even smaller standard errors.
29As noted by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) this procedure often leads to bandwidth choices that
are similar to those based on the optimal bandwidth for estimation of only the di↵erences in expected
outcomes (and applying the same bandwidth to the expectations of treatment probabilities). This holds
also true in our case.
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regression equations are given by:
Yid = ↵+ f0(fMd) + Tid[⌧ + f1(fMd)  f0(fMd)] + "id, (4)
Tid =   + h0(fMd) +Rd[  + h1(fMd)  h0(fMd)] + ⌫id,
where Rd = 1[Md 6 M0] indicates eligibility.30 Since the political rule is applied at the
district level d, we correct the estimated variance-covariance matrix for clustering at the
level of districts and for heteroskedasticity of arbitrary form. We limit the sample to
observations belonging to districts characterized by Md  150.
5 E↵ects on local economic activity
5.1 Income per km2
Before turning to regressions, a graphical illustration of the data at the ZRG border is
instructive. In Figure 4, we plot our main measure of economic activity (log income per
km2) for the years 1986 and 2010 as a function of distance to the ZRG border. In addition
the plots include local mean of the outcome within equally-sized bins. The number of
bins is chosen according to a data-driven method introduced by Calonico, Cattaneo, and
Titiunik (2015). Panels in the left and right column use di↵erent windows and di↵erent
control functions, but both reveal marked discontinuities at the ZRG border, both con-
temporaneously and persistently. Note that we assign positive and negative distances to
the treatment and control region, respectively. As shortcoming of the graphical analysis is
that by collapsing the two-dimensional location to a scalar measure of distance from the
treatment border we cannot ensure that observations to the left and right of the threshold
are de facto located in a short distance from each other.31 We follow Calonico, Cattaneo,
and Titiunik (2015) and apply an optimal data-driven choice of the number of equally
sized bins. As a second observation, it seems that transfers have shifted economic activ-
ity from the western (non-treated) side of the ZRG border to the eastern (treated) side.
We will examine this potential externality more closely in section 5.4 below. While such
30In what follows, we will generally use linear probability models in the first stage, but the results are
very similar to those obtained with a nonlinear probability model in the first stage.
31As the ZRG border runs more or less straight from the south to the north this shortcoming of the
graphical analysis can be mitigated by controlling for a linear trend of latitude (see earlier version of the
manuscript Ehrlich and Seidel, 2015). However, this is not consistent with the data-driven bin choice.
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Figure 4: Discontinuities in economic activity
Contemporaneous e↵ect: 1986
Panel A Panel B
Persistent e↵ect: 2010
Panel C Panel D
Notes: We run separate regressions on each side of the threshold. The plots represent local sample means using
nonoverlapping evenly spaced bins on each side of the threshold following the data-driven method for optimal
choice of the number of bins described in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2015). The lines represent a 4th-order
polynomial distance control function for the 60km window (Panels A and C) and a quadratic control function for
the 10km window (Panels B and D).
graphical analyses provide a transparent first assessment of whether a discontinuity exists,
they provide only limited information about statistical significance and the magnitude of
the e↵ects. We thus turn to regression analysis.
Starting with the spatial RDD, Table 3 confirms the first impressions from the plots:
Regional transfers to the Zonenrandgebiet exerted a strong and significant e↵ect on eco-
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Table 3: Spatial RDD: Income per km2
Distance control Coordinate control Non-parametric
3rd 5th 2nd 3rd h⇤ 0.8⇥ h⇤ 1.2⇥ h⇤
Contemporaneous e↵ect
ATE 0.484⇤⇤⇤ 0.583⇤⇤⇤ 0.296⇤⇤⇤ 0.528⇤⇤⇤ 0.311⇤⇤⇤ 0.552⇤⇤⇤ 0.239⇤⇤⇤
(0.099) (0.147) (0.079) (0.099) (0.079) (0.099) (0.069)
[0.111] [0.157] [0.089] [0.110] - - -
Adj. R2 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.16 - - -
AIC 10,750 10,732 10,869 10,741 - - -
Obs. 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,143 2,297 3,694
Persistent e↵ect
ATE 0.503⇤⇤⇤ 0.542⇤⇤⇤ 0.296⇤⇤⇤ 0.535⇤⇤⇤ 0.370⇤⇤⇤ 0.518⇤⇤⇤ 0.288⇤⇤⇤
(0.095) (0.142) (0.076) (0.095) (0.077) (0.097) (0.067)
[0.108] [0.154] [0.086] [0.107] - - -
Adj. R2 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.22 - - -
AIC 10,454 10,438 10,541 10,404 - - -
Obs. 3,881 3,881 3,881 3,881 3,095 2,203 3,652
Notes: ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, ⇤ denote significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis, Conley (1999) standard errors in squared brackets. We drop all observations outside a 100km window
of the ZRG border in the parametric specifications. Columns (1)-(4) include state indicators, where (1) and (2)
include segment fixed e↵ects in addition. Columns (5)-(7) refer to non-parametric specifications where h⇤ denotes
the optimal bandwidth computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
nomic activity (log income per km2). We run three types of regressions. First, we include
a distance control function using asymmetric 3rd- and 5th-order polynomials with segment
and state fixed e↵ects. We choose the polynomial orders on the basis of the AIC. Second,
we directly control for the location of each municipality by including coordinates in addi-
tion to the Euclidean distance. Here we choose 2nd- and 3rd-order polynomials and add
state fixed e↵ects.32 In each case we report robust standard errors as well as standard er-
rors that correct for spatial dependence of unknown form using the method introduced by
Conley (1999). Finally, we run non-parametric regressions where the optimal bandwidth
h⇤ is computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and varied manually for
sensitivity analysis in columns (6)-(7).
Among the parametric regressions both the adjusted R2 and the AIC suggest that the
32The cubic polynomial of latitude and longitude is defined as Lix + Liy + L
2
ix + L
2
iy + L
3
ix + L
3
iy +
LixLiy + L
2
ixLiy + LixL
2
iy. Note that we choose lower order polynomials for f(.) than for g(.) because
the bivariate control function requires more parameters to be estimated than the corresponding univariate
control function.
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Table 4: Fuzzy RDD: Income per km2
Parametric Md Non-parametric
2nd 3rd h⇤ 0.8⇥ h⇤ 1.2⇥ h⇤
Contemporaneous e↵ect
ATE 0.428⇤⇤ 0.482⇤⇤ 0.535⇤⇤⇤ 0.476⇤⇤⇤ 0.564⇤⇤⇤
(0.198) (0.199) (0.087) (0.098) (0.082)
Adj. R2 0.077 0.083 - - -
AIC 11,110 11,088 - - -
Obs. 3,875 3,875 2,143 1,617 2,581
Persistent e↵ect
ATE 0.435⇤⇤ 0.485⇤⇤ 0.360⇤⇤⇤ 0.255⇤⇤⇤ 0.424⇤⇤⇤
(0.207) (0.211) (0.076) (0.079) (0.073)
Adj. R2 0.134 0.139 - - -
AIC 10,793 10,773 - - -
Obs. 3,885 3,885 2,874 2,664 3,041
Notes: ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, ⇤ denote significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered
at the district level in parenthesis. Observations with Md > 150 are dropped from the sample. Columns (1) and (2)
refer to fuzzy RDD specifications using a two-stage instrumental variables procedure and include state indicators.
Note that the instrument is highly relevant in each of the first stages. Specifications (3)-(5) refer to non-parametric
specifications where h⇤ denotes the optimal bandwidth computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
5th- and 3rd-order polynomials are preferred in case of the distance and coordinate control
functions, respectively. However, the reduction in AIC is only marginal which indicates
that there is no further gain to adding higher order terms. Coordinates capture location
more precisely than distance from simple segment fixed e↵ects such that we favor the spec-
ifications in columns (4) and (5). The latter refers to the non-parametric approach with
optimal bandwidth h⇤ which requires less restrictive functional form assumptions. We find
that income per km2 is predicted to be about 30-50 percent higher than in the counterfac-
tual without regional subsidies in 1986, depending on the specification. Moreover, we can
reject the zero for all specifications at a confidence level of 99 percent. The lower panel
displays the corresponding specifications for the persistent e↵ects of transfers measured
in 2010. Notably, all specifications indicate again a positive and highly significant e↵ect.
Most importantly, these estimates remain remarkably similar for each type of specification
in the two panels.
As we have argued before, we can identify causal e↵ects of regional transfers under
even weaker identifying assumptions by exploiting the discontinuity in the probability of
receiving transfers at a distance of 40 kilometers from the ZRG-border. It can be virtually
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ruled out that the 40-kilometer threshold mattered for economic outcomes in the absence
of the ZRG program such that this approach is una↵ected by potential confounding fac-
tors. However, it comes at the cost of lower e ciency as treatment assignment is carried
out on the district level. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 show regressions that use 2nd-
and 3rd-order polynomials of Md as control functions while columns (3)-(5) report non-
parametric regression outcomes with the optimal bandwidth h⇤ and manual adjustments.
Standard errors are generally clustered on the level of districts and we obtain qualitatively
identical results if we estimate the specifications on a sample collapsed by districts. Note
that the non-parametric and contemporaneous estimate increases somewhat compared to
the spatial RDD, but the overall picture shows very similar results when comparing the
estimates to the corresponding coe cients in the spatial RDD in Table 3. This establishes
confidence in the consistent estimation of the treatment e↵ect. Notice that all specifica-
tions yield highly significant treatment e↵ects at conventional levels.
Talking about economic magnitude, the e↵ects might appear fairly high at first sight,
but need to be qualified in at least two respects. First, the predicted average treatment
e↵ect in 1986 is the consequence of subsidies since 1971. As we have documented in section
2, transfers to the Zonenrandgebiet have been quite substantial every year. Second, it is
quite plausible that these estimates include negative externalities of shifting activity from
the control area to the treatment area, so these estimates must not be interpreted as
new economic activity generated by the place-based policy. However, we argue that the
estimates reflect the total causal e↵ect of transfers into the Zonenrandgebiet on the spatial
equilibrium. We provide a more detailed analysis of local relocation in section 5.4.
Although we have discussed identifying assumptions and their plausibility in this con-
text in detail, a straightforward placebo test is to check whether there was a discontinuity
in economic activity prior to treatment. Unfortunately, income data is unavailable at the
municipality level before 1975, so we take GDP data at the more aggregated district level.
Using estimates for 1961, it is immediate from Table 5 that none of the specifications reveal
higher economic activity in the Zonenrandgebiet that was established only ten years later.
The point estimates are positive in the parametric and negative in the non-parametric
specifications, but all of the estimates are far from being statistically significant. Further,
we use pre-treatment information about population density which is available at the mu-
nicipality level and confirms that there are no discontinuities at the ZRG border prior to
the start of the program (see Figure 5 below).
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Table 5: Pre-treatment – 1961
Parametric Md Non-parametric
Income per km2 2nd 3rd h⇤ 0.8⇥ h⇤ 1.2⇥ h⇤
ATE 0.023 0.008 -0.186 -0.297 -0.189
(0.440) (0.443) (0.601) (0.737) (0.541)
Adj. R2 0.350 0.352 - - -
AIC 1,040 1,041 - - -
Obs. 309 309 176 141 193
Notes: ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, ⇤ denote significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Regressions are based on district level data. Observations with Md > 150 are dropped from the
sample. Columns (1) and (2) refer to fuzzy RDD specifications using a two-stage instrumental variables procedure
and include state indicators. Note that the instrument is highly relevant in each of the first stages. Specifications (3)-
(5) refer to non-parametric specifications where h⇤ denotes the optimal bandwidth computed according to Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012).
5.2 Economic channels
What are the underlying channels of higher economic activity in the Zonenrandgebiet?
Most obviously, as transfers were primarily targeted to subsidize firm investments and
public infrastructure, we employ data on private and public capital to explore whether
discontinuities prevail. The German Statistical O ce provides detailed information about
municipalities’ land coverage which we use as capital proxies. public capital measures the
area share of a municipality covered by public infrastructure like streets, railway tracks,
airports, seaports, public squares, or public buildings. Similarly, private capital represents
the area share of a municipality covered by industrial parks, commercial buildings and
residential homes. Further focusing on commercial capital (industrial capital) allows for
insights into the relative importance of business activity versus residences. We also use the
business tax base as an alternative proxy for the private capital stock.33 A second reason
for higher economic activity per square kilometer could be changes in population and
employment. Investment subsidies may also raise labor demand and labor productivity
(arguably through higher capital stock) a↵ecting the migration decision of households.
Furthermore, the ZRG program also supported renovation of private homes, social housing,
and cultural activities rendering living in the treatment area more appealing. Finally, we
explore whether the human capital of the workforce di↵ers systematically between the
treatment and the control area. We proxy human capital by the share of residents with a
33Note that the business tax base is defined homogeneously across all municipalities in Germany. private
capital is the sum of residential capital and industrial capital.
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tertiary degree.
For the sake of brevity, we show results from the spatial RDD stressing that the findings
Table 6: Channels I: Capital
Contemporaneous e↵ects Persistent e↵ects
Coordinate control Nonparametric Coordinate control Nonparametric
2nd 3rd h⇤ 2nd 3rd h⇤
Business tax base per km2
ATE 0.366⇤⇤⇤ 0.720⇤⇤⇤ 0.652⇤⇤⇤ 0.463⇤⇤⇤ 0.848⇤⇤⇤ 0.800⇤⇤⇤
(0.124) (0.157) (0.148) (0.114) (0.144) (0.142)
Adj. R2 0.17 0.19 - 0.18 0.20 -
AIC 12,795 12,718 - 13,244 13,161 -
Obs. 3,533 3,533 2,318 3,792 3,792 2,299
Private capital stock
ATE 0.197⇤⇤⇤ 0.341⇤⇤⇤ 0.291⇤⇤⇤ 0.193⇤⇤⇤ 0.298⇤⇤⇤ 0.278⇤⇤⇤
(0.062) (0.078) (0.070) (0.058) (0.073) (0.066)
Adj. R2 0.11 0.13 - 0.07 0.08 -
AIC 8,895 8,830 - 8,420 8,369 -
Obs. 3,845 3,845 2,730 3,851 3,851 2,839
Industrial capital stock
ATE 0.415⇤⇤ 0.666⇤⇤⇤ 0.525⇤⇤⇤ 0.344⇤ 0.407⇤ 0.476⇤⇤⇤
(0.191) (0.248) (0.182) (0.182) (0.236) (0.175)
Adj. R2 0.11 0.13 - 0.11 0.12 -
AIC 3,875 3,860 - 3,668 3,656 -
Obs. 1,259 1,259 859 1,234 1,234 822
Public capital stock
ATE 0.147⇤⇤⇤ 0.111⇤⇤⇤ 0.153⇤⇤⇤ 0.172⇤⇤⇤ 0.138⇤⇤⇤ 0.207⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.040) (0.039) (0.032) (0.040) (0.040)
Adj. R2 0.27 0.27 - 0.25 0.26 -
AIC 3,885 3,851 - 3,760 3,718 -
Obs. 3,855 3,855 2,433 3,865 3,865 2,312
Notes: ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, ⇤ denote significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. We drop all observations outside a 100km window of the ZRG border in the parametric specifications.
Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) refer to parametric specifications and include state indicators. Columns (3) and (6)
refer to non-parametric specifications where h⇤ denotes the optimal bandwidth computed according to Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). Business tax base per km2 is measured in logarithmic terms. The three measures of capital
stocks are bounded between zero and unity and which renders estimating linear models inappropriate. Thus we
apply a logit transformation to public capital, private capital and industrial capital. Note that data on industrial
capital is available for 1988 in only three states. Therefore, we restrict the contemporaneous and persistent estimates
on these states. Using data on all states in 2010 yields similar results.
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are robust to using fuzzy RDD.34 Table 6 summarizes contemporaneous and persistent
e↵ects of the transfer program on capital. We only report 2nd- and 3rd- order polynomials
of the augmented coordinate control specifications and non-parametric regressions based
on the optimal bandwidth h⇤. The estimates suggest that the ZRG treatment has led to
a markedly higher stock of both private and public capital. For example, the business tax
base per square kilometer is predicted to be around 60-70 percent higher in 1986. Looking
at persistence in 2010, we still find a highly significant e↵ect at an even higher level of
around 80 percent. Taking the area share covered by plants and residential structures,
our estimates suggest that transfers have raised the capital stock by about 30 percent
both in 1984 and 2010. Distinguishing between industrial and residential structures, we
observe that ZRG treatment led to a higher increase in industrial premises as the e↵ect on
industrial capital turns out higher than the e↵ect on aggregate private capital. The public
capital stock is predicted to be about 10-20 percent higher compared to the counterfactual.
Turning to labor as a potential channel for higher economic activity and using the same
specifications as above, Table 7 reveals that population density was raised by about 40
percent with no indication of a decline in the long term. Econometrically speaking, com-
muting is costless at the ZRG-border so the change in population can only be attributed to
subsidies for social housing and renovation of private residences. The discontinuity in em-
ployment per square kilometer is even more pronounced at about 60-70 percent indicating
substantial commuting into the Zonenrandgebiet.35 However, we find no evidence that the
composition of the workforce with respect to skills was a↵ected by treatment. The share
of high-skilled employees in the Zonenrandgebiet does not di↵er from the counterfactual
scenario without transfers.
It is informative to take a closer look at how the magnitude of e↵ects has developed
over time. As we have argued in the previous subsection, GDP is only available at the
district level and at fewer intervals than population data. Since we have found significant
and large e↵ects of ZRG transfers on population density, we run the specification with
coordinate control functions for a number of years between 1961 and 2010. Figure 5
reveals di↵erences in population densities between the Zonenrandgebiet and the control
34Results from the fuzzy RDD can be obtained from the authors upon request.
35Monte, Redding, and Rossi-Hansberg (2015) show that di↵erences in commuting intensities yield
substantial heterogeneity of the local employment elasticity to productivity shocks. By analyzing the
e↵ect on variables measured at place of residence (income, population) and place of work (business tax
base, employment) we can infer the e↵ect of transfers on commuting intensities.
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Table 7: Channels II: Labor
Contemporaneous e↵ects Persistent e↵ects
Coordinate control Nonparametric Coordinate control Nonparametric
2nd 3rd h⇤ 2nd 3rd h⇤
Population per km2
ATE 0.239⇤⇤⇤ 0.434⇤⇤⇤ 0.372⇤⇤⇤ 0.290⇤⇤⇤ 0.473⇤⇤⇤ 0.425⇤⇤⇤
(0.069) (0.087) (0.077) (0.071) (0.089) (0.079)
Adj. R2 0.19 0.21 - 0.18 0.21 -
AIC 9,846 9,746 - 9,988 9,876 -
Obs. 3,870 3,870 2,745 3,881 3,881 2,717
Employment per km2
ATE 0.418⇤⇤⇤ 0.658⇤⇤⇤ 0.692⇤⇤⇤ 0.467⇤⇤⇤ 0.723⇤⇤⇤ 0.741⇤⇤⇤
(0.108) (0.137) (0.124) (0.110) (0.140) (0.133)
Adj. R2 0.18 0.20 - 0.16 0.17 -
AIC 13,120 13,052 - 12,407 12,346 -
Obs. 3,826 3,826 2,601 3,665 3,665 2,269
Human capital
ATE 0.016 0.213⇤ 0.113 -0.076 0.116 -0.054
(0.082) (0.109) (0.079) (0.071) (0.092) (0.074)
R2 0.13 0.14 - 0.12 0.14 -
AIC 3,555 3,541 - 5,372 5,337 -
Obs. 1,782 1,782 1,373 2,576 2,576 1,886
Notes: ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, ⇤ denote significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. We drop all observations outside a 100km window of the ZRG border in the parametric specifications.
Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) refer to parametric specifications and include state indicators. Columns (3) and (6)
refer to non-parametric specifications where h⇤ denotes the optimal bandwidth computed according to Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012). Population per km2, Employment per km2, and Income per capita are measured in
logarithmic terms. Human capital is bounded between zero and unity and which renders estimating linear models
inappropriate, thus we apply a logit transformation.
area. Note that the points and bars illustrate the point estimates and confidence bands
of parametric specifications according to (2). These outcomes shed light on how transfers
unfolded their e↵ects over time. It is immediate that the di↵erence in population density
developed fairly quickly over the first five to ten years after the introduction of the transfer
program and reached a steady level until the end of the 1980s. We observe no evidence for
a decline of this di↵erence after the program was stopped. Further there is no significant
di↵erence in population density prior to treatment. This finding is in line with the insights
from Table 5 that there was no discontinuity in GDP per square kilometer in 1961.
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Figure 5: Dynamics in population density
Notes: The outcomes are based on spatial RDD with 2nd-order asymmetric coordinate control functions, 100km
boundary sample, and – depending on data availability – between 3,523 (in 1950) and 3,881 (in 2010) municipalities
per year. The vertical lines mark 90-percent confidence intervals.
5.3 What explains persistence?
To guide ideas, we build on a very simple, but general framework. Consider two initially
symmetric regions accommodating locations of unit measure x between the boundaries
 x¯ and x¯.36 The common (treatment) border is referred to by x = 0. One region with
locations x 2 [0; x¯] receives treatment T (referred to by +) while the other region with
locations x 2 [ x¯; 0] does not (referred to by  ). A region can be understood as an area
composed of municipalities or as a municipality composed of small grid cells – depending
on the level of aggregation in our empirical analysis. We define economic activity as output
in location x as
Q(x) = A(x, I)I(x,A, T ). (5)
Output is increasing in physical inputs I(·) (for example, labor, capital, public goods or
a combination thereof) and in a production amenity A(·). We assume the production
amenity to be composed of two parts such that A(x, I) = Aext(x, I)Aown(x, I). While the
36Note that in the empirical analysis we weight outcomes by area and consider equally distributed grid
cells.
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first part dissipates in space, the second component is confined to the respective location.
To ensure that there is always some economic activity in both regions, we impose that
A(·) is hump-shaped in I capturing the idea that dispersion forces dominate agglomeration
forces at a certain level of economic density or economic frictions (like trade costs). For
example, Aext(·) can be understood as agglomeration economies stemming from knowledge
spillovers, labor market pooling, supply linkages or home-market e↵ects, among others
(Marshall, 1920, and Duranton and Puga, 2004). Aown(·), in contrast, captures all e↵ects
on productivity that occur only under the condition of being located in that location (e.g.
better public facilities, capital structures, tax benefits, etc.). Our specification of economic
activity allows for hysteresis as inputs depend on production amenities and vice versa (as
e.g. in Krugman, 1991). With respect to the second part in (5), we assume that (i)
treatment T raises inputs and (ii) more productive locations have an incentive to invest
more, so @I(·)/@A(·) > 0.37
To make both the contemporaneous and persistent e↵ects of treatment transparent,
we evaluate the model at three distinct points in time: 1. before treatment, 2. during
treatment, and 3. after treatment.
1. Before treatment. As both regions are initially identical and T+ = T  = 0, it
is immediate that input and production amenity levels are identical. Relating (5) to our
empirical specification by taking logs and comparing economic activity at the treatment
border x = 0 implies: lnQ(0+)  lnQ(0 ) = 0, where x = 0+ and x = 0  refer to locations
converging to x = 0 from the treatment and the control side, respectively.
2. During treatment. Now suppose that one region receives treatment T+ > 0
while T  = 0 (e.g. capital subsidies or provision of public infrastructure). This leads to
an increase in I+ in a first step while I  remains unchanged. We refer to this as the direct
input e↵ect of treatment. In a second step, the di↵erence in I(·) raises the production
amenity stimulating more input investments in consecutive steps until @A(·)/@I(·) = 0.
We call this the self-reinforcing e↵ect. Importantly, however, externalities do not stop at
local borders so locations close to x = 0 benefit from input intensities on both sides of
the threshold. We follow recent work by Turner, Haughwout, and van der Klaauw (2014)
by assuming that Aext(x) is a weighted average of input intensity of neighboring locations
37This feature is in line with heterogeneous firms models, e.g. Melitz (2003) or Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008).
27
according to
Aext(x) =
1   (x)
2
Z 0 
 x¯
I(x)dx+
1 +  (x)
2
Z x¯
0+
I(x)dx. (6)
We define  (x) to be a weakly increasing continuous function with  (x) =  1 if x 
 x0 ^  x0 >  x¯,  (0 ) =  (0+) = 0 and  (x) = 1 if x   x0 ^ x0 < x¯. Hence,
according to (6) locations x = 0  and x = 0+ experience the same level of externality,
that is Aext(0+) = Aext(0 ). With respect to the location-specific production amenity,
we observe a discontinuity at x = 0 due to di↵erences in input intensities at this location.
Using these insights and taking logs of (5), we obtain at x = 0 a discontinuity
 Q(0) =  I(0) + Aown(0),
where   refers to the di↵erence in the logs of the respective variables. Importantly,
the observed discontinuity does not contain Aext. Note that agglomeration externalities
do raise economic activity, but it is in the nature of spatial RD identification that all
continuous e↵ects are not part of the discontinuity. Intuitively, self-reinforcing externalities
exert the same incentive for investment at x = 0+ and x = 0 . Figure 6 provides a
graphical illustration of this argument.
3. After treatment. After the end of the program, locations in the former treatment
region no longer receive transfers and T+ = T  = 0. Hence, for the gap in economic
activity to persist, our framework suggests two explanations: either inputs I stay at
the same level even in the absence of treatment (e.g. capital does not depreciate) or
location-specific productivity Aown remains at a higher level in the former treatment area
persistently.
While some type of inputs like public infrastructure generate long-run e↵ects, they
depreciate as well and we should at least observe a decline in the discontinuity over time.
This is especially true if we consider investments that were undertaken at the beginning of
the treatment period in the early 1970s. Recall from Figure 5 that the average treatment
e↵ect reached its persistent level only within a few years. Moreover, our results do not
provide any evidence for a decline in employment or capital stocks. We thus favor the
interpretation that the policy has generated a location-specific productivity advantage.
This advantage could stem from better governance with regard to managing commercial
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Figure 6: Direct e↵ect versus productivity e↵ect
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Notes: The dashed line refers to the situation without transfers. The solid line refers to the output with transfers
and the dotted lines illustrate the “direct input e↵ect” and the “productivity e↵ect”. The area left of x = 0 belongs
to the control group whereas observations right of x = 0 receive transfers.
activities that municipalities have developed during the treatment period. Alternatively,
we have shown that the policy has raised economic activity and thus the tax base. With
higher tax revenues, municipalities have more means to maintain better local infrastruc-
ture. Moreover, it might be easier to attract firms due to the sunk factors associated with
land-use planning, so “commercial and residential structures may serve as focal points”
(Redding, 2010). Further, adjustment costs may prevent firms from relocating after the
end of the policy. With fixed costs and imperfect divisibility of investments it may be
more profitable for firms to reinvest in existing structures instead of building new facili-
ties on the green field. While the latter argument does not apply for entry of new firms
the expansion of an existing commercial zone might generally be less expensive than the
development of a new zone.
Continuity of externalities. The conclusion that agglomeration externalities cancel
in the RD design hinges on the assumption that  (x) is a continuous function. So far,
we have built our empirical analysis on administrative data at the municipality level such
that outcome variables were assigned to the municipalities’ centroids. A natural concern
would be that there is little or no economic activity at the boundaries of jurisdictions
introducing frictions in the di↵usion of externalities around the treatment border. In our
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simple theoretical framework this would imply  (0 ) =  " and  (0+) = " with 0 < "  1.
If " = 1, any spillover at the treatment border is ruled out.
The assumption that  (x) is a continuous function at x = 0 becomes more credible if we
were able to use more disaggregated data around the treatment boundary. In that case, the
distance between x = 0+ and x = 0  e↵ectively converges to zero. Two sources of satellite
data prove useful in this context. First, we use information on capital structures at a grid
cell level of 100m ⇥ 100m provided by the European Environmental Agency’s CORINE
project. The satellite data contain information on numerous di↵erent land cover classes
and we set PrivateCapital = 1 if a location is covered by private capital structures.38 Note
that the area-weighted sum of PrivateCapital is highly correlated with our municipality-
level variable for private capital (correlation coe cient of 0.84). Second, we exploit night-
light radiance as a proxy for local GDP (see Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil, 2012) at
grid cells of 30⇥ 30 arcseconds (926m⇥ 926m at the equator).39
It is evident from Table 8 that both data sources are associated with positive and highly
significant average treatment e↵ects. Note that the estimates for Prob(PrivateCapital =
1) on the grid-cell level are well in line with the estimates for the area share of a mu-
nicipality covered by private capital as displayed in Table 6. The latter indicated that
the logit-transformed area share of private capital, i.e. the odds ratio, increased by 19-34
percent due to transfers. Given that Prob(PrivateCapital = 1) is about 6 percent in
our data, a 1.6 percentage points increase in Prob(PrivateCapital = 1) as displayed in
columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 corresponds to ln( 0.0761 0.076
1 0.06
0.06 ) ⇡ 0.253, i.e. an increase of
about 25.3 percent in the odds ratio. To compare the finding relating to radiance, we first
compute a conversion factor of income per km2 and radiance per km2 of 1.045 using West
German municipality data. Thus, the radiance estimates suggest an increase in GDP per
km2 of 21-31 percent. Most importantly, the e↵ects estimated from grid-cell data show
again a high degree of persistence. Hence, the analysis of grid-cell data suggests that there
must be something beyond agglomeration externalities that drives persistence.
We pursue an additional exercise to further examine the potential role of frictions at
38In particular, PrivateCapital = 1 if a place is covered by ‘Continuous urban fabric’, ‘Discontinuous
urban fabric’, ‘Industrial or commercial units’, or ‘Construction sites’ and zero otherwise.
39This data is provided by the Defence Meteorological Satellites Program – Operational Linescan System
(DMSP-OLS). The satellite data report digital integer numbers ranging from 0 to 63. These may be
converted to radiance as a measure of night luminosity by using the formula radiance = digitalnumber1.5
for a spatial unit which is denoted in terms of Watts/cm2/sr/nm (in words: Watts per squared centimeter
per steradian per nanometer of wave length).
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Table 8: Spatial RDD: Grid cell data
Contemporaneous e↵ects Persistent e↵ects
Coordinate control Nonparametric Coordinate control Nonparametric
2nd 3rd h⇤ 2nd 3rd h⇤
Prob(PrivateCapital = 1)
ATE 0.016⇤⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤⇤ 0.019⇤⇤⇤ 0.031⇤⇤⇤
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 - 0.01 0.02 -
AIC -210,193 -218,436 - 1,214,637 1,201,129 -
Obs. 7,786,402 7,786,402 1,138,278 7,786,402 7,786,402 1,661,047
Log(Radiance)
ATE 0.298⇤⇤⇤ 0.281⇤⇤⇤ 0.252⇤⇤⇤ 0.285⇤⇤⇤ 0.206⇤⇤⇤ 0.198⇤⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.021) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018) (0.023)
Adj. R2 0.08 0.10 - 0.09 0.12 -
AIC 256,617 254,503 - 290,388 286,205 -
Obs. 107,776 107,776 49,304 125,527 125,527 24,196
Notes: ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, ⇤ denote significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. We drop all observations outside a 40km window of the ZRG border. The dependent variable in
columns (1)-(3) is a binary indicator which is unity if a 100m ⇥ 100m grid is covered by private buildings and
zero otherwise. In columns (4)-(6) we use log(Radiance) as computed from satellite night-light data for grid cells
of 30 arc-seconds (about 926m ⇥ 926m at the equator). Information on land coverage and radiance refer to the
years 1990 and 1992, respectively. Columns (3) and (6) refer to non-parametric specifications where the bandwidth
h⇤ is computed according the algorithm introduced by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and standard errors are
computed according to Imbens and Lemieux (2008).
the treatment border. The idea is to exploit heterogeneity along the ZRG border and to
estimate the treatment e↵ects for radiance and private capital structure based on grid cells
that belong to municipalities where potential frictions are presumably less pronounced.
First, we restrict our sample to the 10 percent of municipalities that feature the highest
(area-weighted) number of roads crossing the treatment border. Second, we compute the
amount of undeveloped land within a 1km bu↵er on both sides of the treatment border.
Using this information we restrict the sample to the 10 percent of municipalities featur-
ing the lowest share of undeveloped land in the neighborhood of the boundary. Third,
suspecting that unobservable social networks may display frictions at the treatment bor-
der, we estimate the e↵ects only for polycentric municipalities arguing that ties within
such scattered municipalities are weaker (relative to cross-border networks) than in mono-
centric municipalities. If frictions play a role, we would expect lower estimates in these
exercises compared to those displayed in Table 8. As shown in Appendix D, this is not
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unambiguously the case. While some point estimates go up, others are somewhat lower
than those in the full sample. Importantly, these estimates based on small subsamples are
not di↵erent from the corresponding ones in Table 8 at conventional significance levels. In
conclusion, it is impossible to entirely rule out agglomeration economies as an explanation
for the estimated discontinuities on the basis of observable variation along the border,
but the evidence clearly points towards a further important channel to explain spatial
persistence.
Interaction e↵ects. Finally, the persistence in economic activity could also be driven
by an interaction between density and economic shocks (e.g. globalization, fiscal policy,
labor market reforms etc.). In our simple framework @Q/@A@I > 0 holds such that a common,
positive productivity shock benefits formerly subsidized regions more than the control
regions as long as input di↵erences remain. To shed light on the importance of interaction
e↵ects we exploit two exogenous shocks that were arguably most important for the region,
German reunification in 1990 and EU Enlargement in 2004.40 To identify the e↵ects, we
combine the discontinuity approach with time variation to examine whether discontinuities
di↵er before and after the events. Comparing municipalities in the close neighborhood of
the ZRG-border ensures that municipalities are a↵ected similarly by changes in market
access. We focus on population density due to superior data coverage. Our di↵erences-in-
discontinuities specification can be directly derived from (2), so we have
Yit = ↵+  t + g0(Di) + f(Li) + Ti[⌧ + g1(Di)  g0(Di) +  St] + f(LiSt) + "it. (7)
Note that Ti indicates whether a municipality is located in the Zonenrandgebiet and St
is a dummy variable equal to one after the shock has occurred (post-1990 and post-2004,
respectively) and zero otherwise. Based on the insights from Redding and Sturm (2008)
that the benefits of market access are declining in distance, we include a term that inter-
acts the shock with location, f(LiSt). Note that accounting for regional subsidies raises
the causal e↵ect of market access as identified in Redding and Sturm (2008) by about 45
percent as shown in an earlier version of the manuscript (see Ehrlich and Seidel, 2015).
Moreover, time fixed e↵ects  t absorb all common per-period e↵ects of the shocks. We are
interested in the contribution of the respective shocks for the overall discontinuity, that
is  /(  + ⌧). While the main e↵ects shown in Table 9 are very similar to the benchmark
40In a related di↵erence-in-di↵erences approach, Bru¨lhart, Carre`re, and Trionfetti (2012) study the
employment response in Austrian municipalities due to the Fall of the Iron Curtain.
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specifications in Table 7, it is immediate that the interaction e↵ects of German reunifica-
tion and EU enlargement with ZRG-treatment explain only between 2 and 6 percent of
the total discontinuity.41
Table 9: Reunification & EU integration
Reunification EU integration
Population per km2 2nd. order 3rd. order 2nd. order 3rd. order
ZRG 0.240⇤⇤⇤ 0.464⇤⇤⇤ 0.305⇤⇤⇤ 0.504⇤⇤⇤
(0.071) (0.089) (0.072) (0.090)
S ⇥ ZRG 0.016⇤⇤⇤ 0.008 0.009⇤ 0.011⇤
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
includes coordinate controls
Adj. R2 0.196 0.223 0.181 0.209
AIC 18,969 18,704 18,973 18,714
Obs. 7,502 7,502 7,456 7,456
Notes: ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, ⇤ denote significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Standard errors clustered
at municipality level in parenthesis. We drop all observations outside a 100km window of the ZRG border. ZRG
indicates location in the Zonenrandgebiet, S is a shock that refers to Reunification in columns (1) and (2) and to
EU   Integration in columns (3) and (4). In the former case the years refer to 1989 and 1995 whereas the years
are 2003 and 2010 in the case of EU   Integration.
5.4 Local relocation
An aspect that we have so far ignored is local relocation at the treatment border. The
above results do not allow inference about the net e↵ect of the policy as our estimate of
the average treatment e↵ect is likely to contain a relocation externality that does show
a discontinuity at the treatment border. Firms that are located in the Non-ZRG close
to the treatment border are not indi↵erent between locating one meter to the left and
one meter to the right of the threshold. We should thus expect that ZRG-treatment
draws economic activity from the control area to the Zonenrandgebiet. Assuming that
migration costs are increasing in distance, we should observe particularly strong relocation
activities in a close neighborhood of the ZRG-border. Combining this e↵ect with the net
agglomeration externality/productivity e↵ect in Figure 6 could result in a function that is
represented by the solid curve in Figure 7. The way we have incorporated it implies that
41Further robustness checks, most importantly substitutive policies after the end of the program, are
relegated to Appendix C.
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Figure 7: Relocation
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Notes: The di↵erence between the dotted lines shows the sum of the “direct input e↵ect” and the “productivity
e↵ect” generated by the transfers. The solid and dashed lines illustrate the output levels with and without local
relocation, respectively. The area left of x = 0 belongs to the control group whereas observations right of x = 0
receive transfers.
the relocation externality dominates, but we have no priors about the magnitude of this
relocation externality. If this shifting of economic activity is relevant in size, our estimates
of lnQ(0+)   lnQ(0 ) capture both the direct e↵ect due to subsidies and the relocation
externality due to further inputs moving from the control to the treated area. Note,
however, that the continuous agglomeration externalities still cancel at the ZRG border
and locational advantage has to play a key role for inputs to relocate and in particular to
remain in the ZRG region once transfers were phased out.
In the following we aim to quantify the degree of local relocation included in our
estimates. We apply a spatial exclusion approach that relies on estimating the e↵ect
for treatment and control observations that are located su ciently distant from each
other. The idea is that these municipalities are not a↵ected by (local) externalities of
the policy (see Neumark and Kolko, 2010). According to Figure 7 the aim is to estimate
lnQ(x¯)   lnQ( x¯). Obviously, this approach contradicts the identification strategy of
the spatial RDD which relies on the comparison of outcomes for observations in a close
neighborhood. However, we may execute this exercise in the fuzzy RDD. We exploit the
fact that each district with Md ⇠ M0 accommodates a number of municipalities with
34
varying distances to the treatment border. Thus, by excluding municipalities in the close
neighborhood of B we can remove the part of district outcome that is potentially con-
taminated by spillovers (see Figure E1 in the appendix for details). We estimate (4) for a
sub-sample that excludes all municipalities bordering B and additionally establish mini-
mum distances between treatment and control units of 10 kilometers and 20 kilometers in
two alternative specifications. Yet, the requirement to maintain a high density of districts
at the threshold M0 limits the minimum distance we can establish between treatment and
control observations. It may therefore be impossible to eliminate relocation externalities
completely.42
The estimation results for the spatial exclusion approach are highlighted in Table 10.
There are three specifications: (i) “border” excludes all municipalities adjacent to the
treatment border, (ii) “5,000m” ignores all jurisdictions whose centroid is located within 5
kilometers to the ZRG border, and (iii) “10,000m” is a similar exercise for the 10-kilometer
range. Note that all results are based on the contemporaneous sample.
Starting with the baseline results in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4, we observe from
specification “border” that the average treatment e↵ect drops from 0.482 to 0.449 and from
0.535 to 0.465 in the parametric and nonparametric specifications, respectively. Further
restricting the sample to minimum distances of up to 10,000 meters yields a reduction of the
point estimates of about one third compared to the benchmark results. Hence, assuming
that the externality dissipates linearly implies that relocation activities must occur within
60km to explain the total e↵ect. Note, however, that this would comprise a substantial
part of West Germany as the mean distance to B across all non-treated municipalities
(in all states) is about 113km. With a minimum distance of 10,000m we loose e ciency
and the share of observations displaying a level of Md in the neighborhood of 40 drops
considerably.43 In summary, there is evidence for substantial relocation externalities. This
is consistent with our finding that a shift of population towards the subsidized regions is
among the key drivers of the aggregate e↵ect on income per square kilometer. However,
we may not completely determine the spatial extent of these negative externalities.
42An alternative would be to estimate the gradient of the solid line in Figure 7. A negative (positive)
gradient in the treated (control) region would reveal that the relocation externality dominates and the size
of the absolute magnitude provides information about the degree of relocation. We have implemented this
alternative approach in an earlier version of the manuscript (see Ehrlich and Seidel, 2015) and show that
the implied degree of relocations turns out qualitatively similar to the spatial exclusion approach.
43While Md 2 [30, 50] holds for about 15 percent of the observations in our benchmark specification,
this share drops to about 8 percent with the 10km-exclusion window.
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Table 10: Relocation externalities
Log income 3rd. order polynomial of Md Nonparametric h
⇤
per km2 border 5,000m 10,000m border 5,000m 10,000m
ATE 0.449⇤⇤ 0.396⇤ 0.336 0.465⇤⇤ 0.435⇤⇤ 0.358
(0.220) (0.209) (0.239) (0.217) (0.218) (0.259)
Adj. R2 0.09 0.09 0.10 - - -
Obs. 3,514 3,408 3,084 1,784 1,678 1,360
Notes: ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, ⇤ denote significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. We exclude all municipalities
that are bordering B (columns (1), (6)), and are within a distance of 5km and 10km from B (columns (2),(3)
and (5),(6)). We estimate the fuzzy RDD specifications using a parametric 2SLS approach in columns (1)-(3) and
the nonparametric approach in columns (4)-(6). Observations with Md > 150 are dropped from the sample and
standard errors are clustered at the district level.
6 Incidence: Who benefitted from transfers?
Policy makers often have low-income households in mind when favoring transfers to lagging
regions.44 However, according to spatial equilibrium theory it is unclear who eventually
benefits from the place-based policy. If subsidies raise local investments and wages, it is
likely that higher incomes translate into immigration, higher demand, and thus higher
prices for land and housing. As a consequence, pre-treatment property owners reap the
benefits and higher nominal income is eaten up by higher land rents.
We run the same regressions as in the spatial discontinuity approach with income
per capita and land prices as outcome variables to shed light on this question. For con-
temporaneous e↵ects, land prices are only available for a subsample of municipalities
(Lower-Saxony), while we have information for all relevant states in 2010. We observe
from Table 11 that nominal income per capita has increased by about 4-8 percent both
contemporaneously and persistently. However, land prices went up by about 25-35 per-
cent, depending on the specification. As households in Germany spend about 30 percent
of their net income on rents,45 real wages in the Zonenrandgebiet have not increased.
According to the framework established by Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) increases
in consumption amenities should be associated with lower real wages in spatial equilibrium.
Di↵erences in nominal wages may however prevail as a result of di↵erences in production
amenities. This is consistent with persistent location-specific productivity advantages in
44See, for example, European Commission (2014).
45Source: Federal Statistical O ce, 2012, Fachserie 15 Reihe 1, Wirtschaftsrechnungen.
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Table 11: Per-capita income and land prices
Contemporaneous e↵ects Persistent e↵ects
Coordinate control Nonparametric Coordinate control Nonparametric
2nd 3rd h⇤ 2nd 3rd h⇤
Log income per capita
ATE 0.028⇤⇤ 0.083⇤⇤⇤ 0.038⇤⇤⇤ 0.006 0.067⇤⇤⇤ 0.044⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014)
Adj. R2 0.79 0.80 - 0.14 0.17 -
AIC -3,545 -3,749 - -2,874 -3,047 -
Obs. 3,870 3,870 3,035 3,881 3,881 2,867
Log land prices
ATE 0.121 0.392⇤⇤⇤ 0.269⇤⇤ 0.220⇤⇤⇤ 0.353⇤⇤⇤ 0.260⇤⇤⇤
(0.111) (0.150) (0.117) (0.049) (0.060) (0.063)
Adj. R2 0.23 0.31 - 0.25 0.30 -
AIC 1,759 1,648 - 6,749 6,493 -
Obs. 982 982 410 3,635 3,635 2,350
Notes: Land prices per m2 and income per capita are in logs. ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, ⇤ denote significance at the 1-, 5-, and
10-percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. In 1988 we have only data for Lower Saxony.
Land prices correspond to so-called ‘Bodenrichtwerte’ which are expert evaluations of the land value net of the
structures value. These values exist for land allocated to di↵erent usage types (housing, business and industry) of
which we take the average. Note that the results are robust to individual usage types. We drop all observations
outside a 100km window of the ZRG border in the parametric specifications. Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) refer to
parametric specifications and include state indicators. Columns (3) and (6) refer to non-parametric specifications
where h⇤ denotes the optimal bandwidth computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
the formerly subsidized regions.
These capitalization e↵ects have not been documented in such a pronounced way in
the context of place-based policies (see Neumark and Simpson, 2015).46 One reason why
we do find evidence for such e↵ects could be the long-term time horizon of the policy.
Transfers were granted for the time of German division which was unforeseeable to end in
1990. As migration decisions are forward-looking, the indefinite time horizon of the policy
could have supported the e↵ectiveness of the program substantially.
Note that local subsidies are likely to exert positive externalities on land prices in the
neighboring regions as shown by Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Owens (2010) for an urban
revitalization program in Richmond (VA). If this externality is continuous in space, our
46Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013) find little evidence of capitalization e↵ects when assessing the federal
empowerment zones program in the US.
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discontinuity estimates again reflect the direct e↵ect on land prices in the treated area
which does not include potential externalities.
7 Conclusions
We have shown in this paper that temporary regional transfers are able to a↵ect the
spatial pattern of economic activity in the long run. As the policy was connected to
German division, households and firms expected subsidies to be paid for a longer period
and the volume of transfers was substantial. These circumstances were likely influential
for the e↵ectiveness of the policy as migration and location decisions are forward-looking.
If agglomeration externalities are continuous at the treatment border, the regression
discontinuity design is shown to control for this mechanism as an explanation for persis-
tence. We have used data at the finest spatial scale and executed several robustness checks
to explore the validity of assuming frictions to be absent at the border which assures con-
tinuity of agglomeration economies. While agglomeration economies have been shown to
be an important mechanism to explain spatial economic outcomes in many contexts, our
empirical approach allows us to highlight policy-induced locational advantage as another
important channel. For example, the development of land is likely to exert long-term
e↵ects due to the sunk-cost nature of urban planning or municipalities take advantage of
higher economic activity by reinvesting higher tax revenues into local infrastructure to
attract commercial activity. Moreover, persistent locational advantage can be generated
by sizable adjustment costs at the firm level. Analyzing interaction e↵ects between density
and prominent aggregate shocks shows that the formerly subsidized places benefit dispro-
portionately from increases in market access. However, interactions can only explain a
small part of the long-term e↵ects.
A second conclusion relates to distributional implications of place-based policies. We
have identified substantial capitalization e↵ects of transfers such that higher nominal in-
comes in the Zonenrandgebiet were derogated by higher land rents. As a consequence,
transfers primarily benefitted pre-treatment land owners in the Zonenrandgebiet rather
than raising real wages.
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Appendix
A Data
A.1 Characteristics of the Zonenrandgebiet
Table A1 displays the number of observations by state as well as the area and population
shares of the ZRG.
A list of all 1971 districts that belonged to the ZRG is contained in the federal law
‘Zonenrandfo¨rderungsgesetz’, 1971. Data on population by municipality is available from
the Federal Statistical O ce for the years 1975-2010. For the years 1950-1970 we have
acquired the data from the Statistical O ces of the five La¨nder we consider. Likewise,
information on income, business taxes, and employment was provided by the statistical
o ces of the individual states. Data on municipal area shares covered by private, public,
commercial, industrial, and residential capital was provided by the Federal Institute for
Research on Building, Urban A↵airs and Spatial Development. The data on land prices
are provided by the states’ expert committees and by F&B real estate consulting
Table A1: Characteristics of the Zonenrandgebiet
No. districts No. municipalities Area ZRG Pop. ZRG
Non-ZRG ZRG Non-ZRG ZRG in % in %
West Germany 396 106 6,839 1,573 18.6 12.3
Schleswig-Holstein 4 14 414 710 53.3 81.3
Lower Saxony 44 25 711 282 28.6 33.4
North-Rhine Westfalia 86 0 386 0 0 0
Hesse 34 13 323 96 27.8 19.1
Bavaria 131 54 1,533 485 25.8 21.9
Other West-German states 97 54 3,472 0 25.8 21.9
Notes: The states (La¨nder) Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Hesse, and Bavaria belonged to the ZRG. We add
North Rhine-Westphalia as it borders with the ZRG, but drop the city states of Hamburg and Bremen. The districts
correspond to the 1971 classification while we use data from 1986 for the number of municipalities, and the year
1961 for population shares.
44
Georeferencing. To georeference municipality data, we use digital maps (shape files)
from the Bundesamt fu¨r Kartographie und Geoda¨sie. As they are only available since
1997, we assign each municipality to a district in 1971 and drop all observations where
the municipality cannot be linked to a district with at least 90 percent of its area (20
municipalities or about 0.4 percent of the sample).47 Moreover, we drop 31 municipalities
due to partial treatment (i.e. ZRG-border crosses the municipality based on the 1997 or
2010 classification). The boundary sample of municipalities contains all jurisdictions with
a distance to the ZRG border of less than 100 kilometers. This includes all municipalities
in the treated region and about 68 percent of the municipalities in the five states west of
the ZRG border. For the boundary sample at the district level, we limit the observations
to jurisdictions that are su ciently close to the threshold determining transfer eligibility
i.e. Md  150. This includes again all treated observations and about 50 percent of
the districts outside the treated area and in the five states. Note that all our analyses are
based on the 1971 district classification such that the number of districts remains constant
over time.
Depending on the municipality classification of each data source we assign it either
to the 1997 or 2010 shape file of municipal boundaries. Thereby, we link 1971 districts
(and thus treatment status), coordinates, and distances from the ZRG boundary to the
outcome variables. Geospatial data processes have been performed and documented in
ArcGIS using shape files about administrative boundaries in 1971, 1997, and 2010. Table
A2 provides information about the data sources of all variables we use and the respective
level of spatial aggregation.
Administrative & satellite data. Table A3 displays summary statistics for all
variables in the boundary sample used in our analysis. income and business taxbase are
measured in current 1,000 euros and in current terms. The average income per square
kilometer was about 1.5 million euros during the transfer program and it increased to about
2.8 million euros in 2010. Note that averages across municipalities deviate from the country
average because cities receive the same weight as small municipalities. Municipalities are
the smallest administrative units comprising on average about 33 square kilometers with
a high standard deviation and a minimum of 0.45 square kilometers while the largest
municipality stretches over 359 square kilometers. The average number of inhabitants
47This may happen due to changes in administrative boundaries that were frequent especially in the
1970s. Note that all our results are robust to the exclusion of all municipalities that could not perfectly
be assigned to a 1971 district.
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increased from about 5,900 in 1986 to 6,500 in 2010. Accordingly, the municipal average
of population density reaches about 160 (178 in 2010) individuals per square kilometer
which is well below the German average of about 220. Likewise, per capita income and
employment density average at relatively low levels of about 25,000 euros and 40 employees
per square kilometer. Note also that 19 (7) municipalities exist in 1986 (2010) that have no
employment and taxable business income such that they will be dropped when specifying
these outcomes in logarithmic terms.
If not stated di↵erently, all variables refer to municipalities. public capital and private
capital measure the area share of a municipality covered by public infrastructure (area used
for streets, railway, airports, seaports, public squares, public buildings etc.) and private
structures (industry, business, and housing), respectively. industrial/private capital refers
to the ratio of industry and business structures in total private structures. human capital
refers to the share of residents with tertiary education. Land prices correspond to current
prices per m2 and stem from evaluations of expert committees.
Private capital and radiance are also summarized for grid cells of 100m ⇥ 100m and
30⇥ 30 arc-seconds (about 926m⇥ 926m at the equator), respectively. Radiance of grids
is computed according to digital integer numbers reported by satellite data of the De-
fence Meteorological Satellites Program – Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS).48
These data measure night-time lights in the year 1992 and are widely used in research
(see, e.g., Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil, 2012). The information on PrivateCapital
is provided by the European Environmental Agencies CORINE project for the year 1990.
The data contains a variable that indicates 44 di↵erent land cover classes. We set
PrivateCapital = 1 if a place is covered by ‘Continuous urban fabric’, ‘Discontinuous
urban fabric’, ‘Industrial or commercial units’, or ‘Construction sites’ and zero other-
wise. Note that the area-weighted sum of PrivateCapital is highly correlated with our
municipality-level variable for private capital which is described in section 3 (correlation
coe cient of 0.84). Moreover, the averages for the area share of private capital measured
at the grid-cell and municipality levels are relatively close to each other even though the
data sources di↵er. The deviation is possibly again due to the identical weight attached
to municipalities of di↵erent size when summarizing the municipality level data.
48The satellite data report digital integer numbers ranging from 0 to 63. These may be converted to
radiance as a measure of night luminosity by using the formula radiance = digitalnumber1.5 for a spatial
unit which is denoted in terms of Watts/cm2/sr/nm (in words: Watts per squared centimeter per steradian
per nanometer of wave length).
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Table A2: Data sources
Variable Spatial aggregation Source
area municipality/district Shapefiles from Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban A↵airs
and Spatial Development; Data by municipality from Federal Statistical O ce
income municipality Statistical O ces of the La¨nder
population municipality Federal Statistical O ce
employment municipality Statistical O ces of the five La¨nder
human capital municipality Federal Employment Agency
public capital municipality/grid cell Federal O ce for Building and Regional Planning;
European Environmental Agency
private capital municipality/grid cell Federal O ce for Building and Regional Planning;
European Environmental Agency
business taxbase municipality Statistical O ces of the La¨nder
land price municipality States’ expert committees; F&B real estate consulting
radiance grid cell NOAA Defence Meteorological Satellites Program
roads municipality/grid cell Openstreetmap.org
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables
Contemporaneous Persistent
Mean Std.dev. Obs. Year Mean Std.dev. Obs. Year
area in km2 33.042 33.378 3,870 1986 33.167 33.572 3,881 2010
income/km2 1522.511 2965.65 3,870 1986 2848.013 4701.864 3,881 2010
radiance (grid cell) 47.928 72.063 107,776 1992 112.420 107.019 125,527 2010
population 5931.77 20318.12 3,870 1986 6530.91 21848.77 3,881 2010
population/km2 160.083 238.896 3,870 1986 178.333 258.123 3,881 2010
employment/km2 39.074 99.598 3,845 1986 48.798 119.153 3,672 2010
income/capita 24.716 11.010 3,870 1986 31.461 7.247 3,881 2010
human capital 0.028 0.024 1,782 1985 0.061 0.048 2,576 2010
public capital 0.044 0.020 3,856 1984 0.051 0.023 3,866 2010
private capital 0.048 0.048 3,856 1984 0.067 0.057 3,866 2010
private capital (grid cell) 0.061 0.239 7,786,402 1990 0.074 0.262 7,786,402 2012
industrial capital 0.007 0.012 1,259 1988 0.007 0.009 1,234 2010
business taxbase/km2 7.606 23.929 3,709 1986 18.194 77.084 3,870 2010
business taxbase/employee 0.201 0.403 3,667 1986 0.425 0.626 3,642 2010
land price 26.197 21.016 982 1988 74.188 70.601 3,635 2010
Notes: We consider the states (La¨nder) Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, and Bavaria. We restrict
the sample to observations located within 100km of the ZRG border. income and business taxbase are measured in current 1,000 euros,
human capital refers to the share of residents with tertiary education, public capital and private capital measure the area share of a
municipality covered by public infrastructure (area used for streets, railway, airports, seaports, public squares, public buildings etc.) and
private structures (industry, business, and housing), respectively. industrial capital refers to the area share of a municipality covered by
industry and business structures. Note that the latter is available for only three states. Land prices correspond to current prices per m2.
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B Non-parametric estimation
For the nonparametric identification strategy we resort to local linear regressions as these
are particular well-suited for inference in the RDD (see Fan and Gijbels, 1996; Imbens
and Lemieux, 2008). We employ an edge kernel function and choose di↵erent bandwidths
according to optimality criteria. We compute the distance of each municipality’s centroid
to 20 (or 30) border points that are allocated at equal distances along B as shown in Figure
B1. Then, we assign municipalities to the closest border point, add border-point fixed
e↵ects, and use the distance to the respective border point in the local linear regressions
to estimate E[Yi0|Li = b] and E[Yi1|Li = b]. All our results are insensitive to choosing
20 or 30 border points (red dots and blue triangles in Figure B1, respectively).
As a further robustness check, we refrain from allocating border points and estimate
bivariate local linear regressions based on Cartesian coordinates. In this approach we use
a product kernel Khx(Lix   L0x)Khy(Liy   L0y) and minimize:
nX
i=1
{Yi   ↵  (Lix   L0x) 1   (Liy   L0y) 1}2Khx(Lix   L0x)Khy(Liy   L0y). (B.1)
Again, this is done separately for units west and east of B to obtain ↵ˆ for both sides.
The pair of bandwidths is chosen according to a cross-validation criterion. In practise
this approach is less e cient than the univariate approach based on border points because
the additional dimension requires disproportionately more observations. Therefore, we
present our non-parametric results generally for the border point approach and note that
all results are robust to employing bivariate local linear regressions (corresponding tables
are available upon request).
C Substitutive policies after 1990
We have shown that transfers to the Zonenrandgebiet led to a persistent increase in in-
come per square kilometer in the target region, channelled through higher capital stock,
population and employment. This outcome can be interpreted as causal if the former
ZRG-border does not exhibit any other discontinuity ex post. For example, one can think
about policy makers trying to compensate households and firms in the former treatment
area in various ways. However, German municipalities do not have control over many pol-
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Figure B1: Border points
Notes: The red dots (green triangles) mark the 20 (30) border points we employ in our analysis. These are allocated
at equal distances along the ZRG border. The black lines mark the inner-German border and the state borders. The
treated states were Bavaria (B), Hesse (H), Lower Saxony (LS) and Schleswig-Holstein (SH). The Czechoslovakian
border is marked in purple. When splitting up the sample into treated units closer to the former GDR or to
Czechoslovakia we use the perpendicular distances of municipal centroids or pixels to the respective borders.
icy instruments. Important tax rates like income taxes are chosen at the federal level and
have to be approved by the states. And those taxes that municipalities can set themselves
are mostly too small to be relevant for location decisions. The business tax rate is an
important exception. One could hypothesize that municipalities in the Zonenrandgebiet
lowered their business tax rates after 1994 to compensate firms for the loss in subsidies.
Based on data from the German Statistical O ce, Table C1 shows that there is no dis-
continuity in business tax rates between 1994 and 2010. Our preferred specifications show
insignificant e↵ects. Those that are significant rather point towards higher tax rates in
the Zonenrandgebiet.
Further, policy makers could have decided to compensate former ZRG-municipalities
by an alternative transfer scheme that substituted the old program, at least to some extent.
We use data from the main regional transfer program, the Joint Task, to illustrate that
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Table C1: Substitutive policies
Local business tax rates (2010) Federal transfers per capita 1994-2010
Coordinate control Nonparametric Coordinate control Nonparametric
2nd 3rd h⇤ 2nd 3rd h⇤
ATE 0.011⇤ -0.001 0.012 45.177 163.825 6.219
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (159.865) (202.927) (33.509)
Adj. R2 0.30 0.31 - 0.01 0.04 -
AIC -8,433 -8,450 - 69,799 69,795 -
Obs. 3,881 3,881 2,783 3,870 3,870 1,168
Notes: ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, ⇤ denote significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. We drop all observations outside a 100km window of the ZRG border in the parametric specifications.
Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) refer to parametric specifications and include state indicators. Columns (3) and (6)
refer to non-parametric specifications where h⇤ denotes the optimal bandwidth computed according to Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). We apply a logit transformation to business tax rates which are bounded between zero and
unity. Federal transfers are aggregated over the years 1994-2010 and divided by the municipal population in 1994.
We use the absolute level of Federal transfers per capita (instead of logs) in order to account for zeros. These results
are robust to a zero-inflated Poisson model that accounts for the relatively high number of zero transfers.
there is no discontinuity in transfer recipience for municipalities at the former ZRG border
between 1994 and 2010 (Table C1, columns (4)-(6)). Instead, we observe a discontinuity
at the former inner-German border. This result fits into the general picture that regional
transfers moved to the new La¨nder after German reunification (see Figure C1).
Information on federal regional transfers by recipient municipality, year, and transfer
type was provided by the Federal O ce for Economic A↵airs and Export Control. We
aggregate over transfer types (infrastructure and subsidies to the private sector) and over
years. While it still holds true after 1994 that transfers are channeled to the east of
Germany, we do not observe a discontinuity at the former ZRG border as is shown in Figure
C1. The left-hand plot corresponds to the results presented in Table C1. Taking into
account that the program was terminated in 1994 and that the former ZRG border does
not correspond to district borders while transfer intensities are determined by districts,
this is not surprising. Moreover, from the right-hand plot in Figure C1 we observe a
pronounced discontinuity of transfer intensity at the former inner-German border. In
addition to federal transfers we have accounted for resources redistributed within states
according to municipal fiscal equalization schemes (in the case of Bavaria). These within
state transfers ‘Bedarfszuweisungen’ are at much lower scale (about 0.3 percent of the
federal transfers) and display no discontinuity at B.
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Figure C1: Transfers 1994-2010
ZRG border Inner-German border
D Grid-cell data
For the analysis at the fines spatial scale we use data on PrivateCapital and Radiance
for grids of 100m ⇥ 100m and 30 ⇥ 30 arc-seconds (about 926m ⇥ 926m at the equator),
respectively (see details about the data in Appendix A). For a sensitivity check about
the role of frictions at municipality borders we consider three subsamples that are ar-
guably less prone to inter-municipality frictions. Table D1 reports in columns (1)-(3) the
contemporaneous and in columns (4)-(6) the persistent average treatment e↵ects of the
ZRG transfers on the probability of a grid cell being covered by private capital and on log
radiance.
The first sensitivity check limits the sample to municipality pairs around the treatment
border that are highly connected. For this we employ data from OpenStreetMap provided
by ThinkGeo which includes all streets and roads in Germany. We drop all small pathways
and trails and use GIS techniques to extract roads that cross the ZRG border B. Then, we
compute for each municipality around B the number of roads which cross both the ZRG
border as well as the respective municipality. To adjust for municipality size this variable
is weighted by municipality area. We keep only grid cells belonging to municipalities in the
upper 10th percentile of the distribution of roads crossing B and the municipality. Thus
the sample size drops by about 90 percent compared to Table 8 while the point estimates
(see columns (1) and (4)) remain highly significant and well in line with those presented
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in Table 8.
For the second experiment we draw a bu↵er at 1km distance from both sides of B. Em-
ploying land-use data from the CORINE project we calculate the share of non-cultivable
land within this bu↵er for all municipalities. We define as non-cultivable land the cat-
egories 23-44 (“Forest and and semi natural areas”, “Wetlands”, “Water bodies”). All
municipalities with more then 5 percent of their land within the 1km bu↵er being non-
cultivable are dropped from the sample. Thus, we estimate the e↵ect on grid cells belonging
to municipality pairs that feature homogeneous characteristics in the neighborhood of B
as the land could be developed at relatively low costs. Again the estimates in columns
(2) and (5) are not increasing substantially compared to the benchmark in Table 8 which
supports the assumption that frictions are not decisive for our results.
The third experiment focuses on polycentric municipalities arguing that social networks
are more dispersed in scattered neighborhoods. For each grid cell in the data set we
calculate the number of grids in a 200, 300, and 400 meter radius that are covered by capital
structures. That is we construct a spatial lag for capitalspatlagi =W⇥capitalj for j 6= i and
W referring to a weight matrix with elements being unity if the distance between i and j is
less than 200, 300, or 400 meters depending on the specification and zero otherwise. Using
the municipality distributions of capitalspatlagi we refer to a point i as a municipality center
if it features the highest number of covered grid cells in the surrounding neighborhood i.e.
if capitalspatlagi corresponds to the municipality maximum. If this binary definition of a
center is unity for multiple adjacent grid cells we aggregate these cells using ArcGIS. In case
this definition yields several but non-adjacent municipality centers (grid-cells that feature
the municipality maximum of capitalspatlagi ) we refer to the municipality as a polycentric
municipality. Independent of the chosen radius, the majority of municipalities turns out
monocentric according to the above definition. For the estimates presented in Table D1
we use the 200 meter radius and keep only municipalities with at least two non-adjacent
centers. The treatment e↵ects remain highly significant and the magnitude is very similar
to the benchmark. Note that this holds also true for using the 300 and 400 meter radii.
E Spatial exclusion approach
The spatial exclusion approach is illustrated in Figure E1 where the blue line marks
the ZRG border. Blue and yellow shaded areas refer to municipalities in our boundary
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Table D1: Robustness: Grid Cell Data
Contemporaneous e↵ects Persistent e↵ects
Connectedness Undeveloped Polycentric Connectedness Undeveloped Polycentric
Prob(PrivateCapital=1)
ATE 0.024⇤⇤⇤ 0.019⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.023⇤⇤⇤ 0.022⇤⇤⇤ 0.014⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Adj. R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Obs. 776,639 147,424 758,968 776,639 147,424 758,968
Log(Radiance)
ATE 0.222⇤⇤⇤ 0.376⇤⇤⇤ 0.203⇤⇤⇤ 0.217⇤⇤⇤ 0.241⇤⇤⇤ 0.214⇤⇤⇤
(0.022) (0.049) (0.035) (0.020) (0.044) (0.030)
Adj. R2 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.24 0.09
Obs. 10,626 2,790 11,579 13,037 3,296 12,665
Notes: ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, ⇤ denote significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. We drop all observations outside a 100km window of the ZRG border in the parametric specifications.
Columns (1)-(3) and (4)-(6) refer to the contemporaneous and persistent estimates, respectively. All estimates
correspond to the parametric specifications and include asymmetric control functions of distance to the ZRG border
as well as coordinate controls. Columns (1) and (4) base on municipality pairs at the ZRG border and in the upper
10th percentile of connectedness. Columns (2) and (5) restrict the sample to municipality pairs at the ZRG border
that are not separated by undeveloped land such as rocks, water bodies, or forests. Columns (3) and (6) restrict
the sample to polycentric municipality pairs at the ZRG border. Observations refer to grid cells of 100m ⇥ 100m
and 30⇥ 30 arc-seconds for private capital and radiance, respectively.
sample that belong to treated and non-treated areas, respectively. District boundaries
(according to the 1971 classification) and municipal boundaries are drawn in red and
black, respectively. In the spatial exclusion approach, we drop all treated (non-treated)
municipalities within a certain distance from the closest non-treated (treated) municipality.
The excluded municipalities are located between the blue and yellow areas (the map
corresponds to a 20-kilometer minimum distance between the treatment and the control
group). By dropping those municipalities in the close neighborhood of the treatment
border, we remove the share of GDP of a district that is potentially a↵ected by positive
or negative spillover e↵ects.
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Figure E1: Relocation Externalities – Spatial Exclusion Approach
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